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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED OR DISCRETIONARY POLICE WORK? 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
 
People v. Kennebrew1 
(decided May 29, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, a debate has stirred over whether the New 
York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) “stop and frisk” practices are 
unconstitutional.2  The Supreme Court of the United States has held 
that the Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and 
seizure are so vital that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more 
carefully guarded.”3  The Fourth Amendment raises great controver-
sies concerning confrontations between police and criminal suspects, 
especially when individuals are searched without a warrant.4  This 
case note will address the standards police are supposed to uphold 
when conducting a warrantless search and seizure in the field.  More 
specifically, this case note will explore the issues raised in People v. 
Kennebrew—which circumstances may yield a reasonable suspicion 
that a citizen poses a danger to a police officer and/or the general 
public, subsequently permitting a “stop and frisk.”  In addition to the 
use of questionable standards in justifying reasonable suspicion, po-
lice practices have resulted in concrete evidence of racial profiling.5  
 
1 965 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013). 
2 See generally Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New 
York: The Aftermath of People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512 (1991) (exploring the in-
creased protections for New York citizens since New York’s landmark decision in People v. 
De Bour and the conflicting interests between prevention of crime by the police and Fourth 
Amendment protections). 
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 
250, 251 (1891)). 
4 Id. at 4. 
5 Sack, supra note 2, at 539 (stating that police frequently rely on race as a factor to iden-
1
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Case law suggests that citizens ought to enjoy strict enforcement of 
the protections under the Fourth Amendment; however, evidence of 
unconstitutional police practices and, more specifically, the NYPD’s 
‘stop and frisk policy’ suggests otherwise. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PEOPLE V. KENNEBREW 
While driving through a neighborhood in which there were 
numerous complaints of drug activity, three police officers noticed 
the defendant standing on a street corner with multiple cigarettes in 
his hand and subsequently approached him in their vehicle.6  As the 
defendant began to walk in the opposite direction, the officers exited 
the car, called out to him, and approached him on foot.7  One officer 
asked the defendant for his name, identification, and whether he was 
selling cigarettes.8  The defendant identified himself, explained his 
reasoning for standing on the street corner, and denied selling ciga-
rettes.9  Then, the officer asked the defendant whether he was in a 
gang because the defendant’s clothes suggested gang affiliation.10  
The defendant admitted to being in a gang, but when he was asked 
whether he had a gun on his person, the defendant did not answer.11  
The police then placed the defendant against the wall, conducted a 
pat-down search, and recovered a handgun from his person.12  The 
defendant stated, “I am going to be in a lot of trouble for this.”13  The 
officers explained that they noticed a bulge on the defendant’s waist-
band, under his clothing, as their reason for conducting the pat-
down.14 
A. The Court’s Analysis of People v. Kennebrew 
The defendant moved to suppress his statement and the physi-
 
tify suspects and “the use of race creates great potential for police abuse, leading to discrimi-
natory intrusions which the fourth amendment was designed to prevent.”). 




10 Id. at 624 (stating that defendant was wearing red and black beads and had a teardrop 
tattoo below his eye). 
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cal evidence against him.15  That motion was granted by the Queens 
County Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division, 
which held that the police officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to 
justify a stop and frisk.16 
The Appellate Division primarily relied on the four-level test 
to evaluate the constitutionality of the encounter between defendant 
and the police, which was delineated by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in People v. De Bour.17  The test provides that: 
[(1)] The minimal intrusion of approaching to request 
information is permissible when there is some objec-
tive credible reason for that interference not necessari-
ly indicative of criminality.  [(2)] The next degree, the 
common-law right of inquiry, is activated by a found-
ed suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits 
a somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is en-
titled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary 
to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible 
seizure . . .  [(3)] the authority to frisk if the officer 
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical in-
jury by virtue of the detainee being armed.  [(4)] Fi-
nally a police officer may arrest and take into custody 
a person when he has probable cause to believe that 
person has committed a crime, or offense in his pres-
ence.18 
In Kennebrew, the court’s primary concern was the third level of po-
lice intrusion because the police officers conducted a “frisk.”19  The 
court ultimately held that it was not reasonable for the officers to sus-
pect that they were in danger of physical injury.20  The prosecution 
contended that the pat-down was justified because of the defendant’s 
failure to answer the officers’ inquiry about the defendant possessing 
a gun and the bulge they noticed in the defendant’s waistband.21  The 
 
15 Id. 
16 Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 624. 
17 People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976) (internal citations omitted). 
18 Id. at 571-72; see also People v. Moore, 847 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (N.Y. 2006) (“Innocu-
ous behavior alone will not generate a founded or reasonable suspicion that a crime is at 
hand.”). 
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court disagreed, relying on People v. Stevenson.22  In Stevenson, the 
court explained that an unidentifiable bulge can be interpreted am-
biguously; persons with a bulge in their waistband is just as likely to 
be innocent as guilty.23  Additionally, the court in Stevenson held that 
a criminal suspect has the right to refuse to answer a police officer’s 
question.24  This right is inherent in the nature of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.25 
Based on the above referenced case law and the lack of factu-
al evidence to illustrate that the officers reasonably believed to be in 
danger from defendant’s actions, the Appellate Division properly 
suppressed the evidence obtained against defendant. 
III. UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
A. United States Supreme Court 
In 1968, the Supreme Court delivered the landmark decision 
of Terry v. Ohio,26 which explored whether a search and seizure in 
the field of police work is reasonable.27  The Court defined precisely 
what constitutes both a “search” and a “seizure” and, subsequently, 
when there are appropriate circumstances for a police officer to per-
form both without a search warrant.28  The Court also alluded to the 
fact that it is imperative to recognize that the performance of a search 
and seizure in public is a major confrontation between protections 
under the Fourth Amendment and the safety of police officers and the 
general public.29  Ultimately, the Court emphasized that a two-part 
responsibility exists between police officers and the courts when con-
sidering the search and seizure of private citizens.30  With regard to 
police officers, there “is a severe requirement of specific justification 
 
22 779 N.Y.S.2d 498 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2004). 
23 Id. at 499. 
24 Id. 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
26 Terry, 392 U.S. at 4. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 10-12. 
29 Id. at 10-15 (acknowledging that while public safety and prevention of crime are a legit-
imate interest, there must be adequate judicial review to balance these interests against 
Fourth Amendment protections in order to sustain judicial integrity and remain mindful of 
the growing distrust between law enforcement and minority groups). 
30 Id. at 11-13. 
4
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for any intrusion upon protected personal security.”31  The Court fur-
ther explained that there is required judicial integrity—“a highly de-
veloped system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the 
State the commands of the Constitution.”32  In reaching its decision, 
the Court heavily relied on the language of the Fourth Amendment.33 
The Court held that an analysis of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion is necessary when a person has been either searched or seized.34  
“[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person . . . [and a search 
is] a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s cloth-
ing.”35  Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead; for 
example, the Second Circuit has emphasized that “[a] seizure occurs 
when (1) a person obeys a police officer’s order to stop or (2) a per-
son that does not submit to an officer’s show of authority is physical-
ly restrained.”36  The Court in Terry emphasized that the police must 
obtain a warrant to conduct a search and seizure whenever it is prac-
ticable.37  Furthermore, a stop may be reasonable, but in order to con-
duct a permissible frisk, there must be a suspicion of violence.38  Es-
sentially, the Court limited the scope of frisk to situations in which 
the intrusion is reasonably believed to yield some kind of weapon or 
instrument that can be used to harm the police officer.39  The issue 
before the Court in Terry, however, dealt with situations where a po-
lice officer reasonably believed he or she was in imminent danger.40  
The Court held that whether the police officer reasonably believed he 
or she was in reasonable danger should be judged by an objective 
standard.41  This standard is “whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
 
31 Terry, 392 U.S. at 11. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
34 Id. at 9. 
35 Id. at 16. 
36 United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2009). 
37 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
38 Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 29 (majority opinion). 
40 Id. at 20. 
41 Id. at 21. 
5
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that of others was in danger.”42  The Court further stressed that “good 
faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough . . . [because if 
this were the case] the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
would . . . [be] in the discretion of the police.”43 
B. United States Court of Appeals 
The task of defining the scope of “reasonable suspicion” was 
further explored by the Second Circuit in United States v. Freeman.44  
In Freeman, a NYPD dispatcher received two calls from an unidenti-
fied caller regarding a Hispanic male with a gun, who was wearing a 
black hat and a white t-shirt, but the dispatcher was unable to confirm 
whether the 911 caller actually saw a firearm.45  Two officers, Joseph 
Walsh and Ryan Conroy, responded to the call from about eight 
blocks away.46  As the officers approached the location, the dispatch-
er notified them that a new call came in, describing the suspect as a 
black male wearing a white du-rag, black hat, and a long white t-
shirt.47  Upon surveying the area, the officers noticed Joseph Freeman 
walking and observed that he fit the most recent description of the 
suspect.48  The officers waited for Freeman to approach their vehicle, 
and once he was in close proximity, Conroy exited the vehicle and 
attempted to talk to Freeman.49  Freeman ignored Conroy and contin-
ued walking, so Conroy grabbed Freeman’s elbow.50  Freeman broke 
Conroy’s grasp and continued walking away and, subsequently, 
Walsh exited the vehicle and grabbed Freeman’s elbow.51  Once 
Freeman shrugged off Walsh, Walsh grabbed Freeman around the 
waist and eventually tripped him to the ground.52  After a short strug-
gle, and with the help of two additional officers who arrived at the 
scene, Freeman was handcuffed, and a gun was found in his waist-
 
42 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
43 Id. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)). 
44 735 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013). 
45 Id. at 94. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 95 
48 Id. 
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band.53  The officers admitted that Freeman never ran off or tried to 
flee.54 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether the 
evidence against Freeman should have been suppressed due to a lack 
of reasonable suspicion.55  The court referred to the holding in United 
States v. Bayless56 to emphasize that reasonable suspicion is not 
based on an “inchoate suspicion or mere hunch,” but rather “specific 
and articulable facts.”57  Also, the court held that the only facts rele-
vant to justify a stop and frisk are those facts that preceded the actual 
stop.58  Thus, the court determined when the officer exercised control 
to restrain Freeman’s liberty and concluded that Freeman was 
stopped when Walsh restrained him around his waist.59  After deter-
mining when the stop occurred, the court had to consider the preced-
ing evidence, which included the 911 call, Freeman’s match to the 
description, and Freeman’s refusal to answer or stop for the officers’ 
inquiries.60  The court held that anonymous tips alone are insufficient 
to justify reasonable suspicion for a valid stop.61  Also, the court de-
termined that Freeman had a right to refuse the officers’ inquiries 
and, by the officers’ admission, his actions were not suspicious be-
cause he did not attempt to flee.62  The court took a rigid stance of de-
fining the need to correctly define reasonable suspicion instead of al-
 
53 Id. 
54 Freeman, 735 F.3d at 95. 
55 Id. (reviewing legal decisions de novo, but reviewing findings of fact for clear error 
from the district court’s conviction of a felon in possession with a firearm). 
56 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that reasonable suspicion is judged against an ob-
jective standard and, therefore, subjective intentions or motives are irrelevant). 
57 Freeman, 735 F.3d at 96 (quoting Bayless, 201 F.3d at 132-33). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (rejecting the government’s argument that a stop only occurred once the officers put 
handcuffs on the suspect). 
60 Id. at 97 (noting that the recovered gun or any suspicious movements by Freeman were 
irrelevant in determining whether the officers had reasonable suspicion at the time of the ini-
tial stop). 
61 Id. at 98; see Florida v. J.L, 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (holding that even an anonymous 
tip that is proven to be completely accurate in its location and description of the suspect is 
insufficient to justify a stop); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (vacat-
ing structured tests for probable caused and holding that a “totality of the circumstances” 
approach on a case-by-case basis will better serve both the public and private interests). 
62 Freeman, 735 F.3d at 102.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“when 
an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the in-
dividual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.  And any refusal to coop-
erate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a 
detention or seizure.”). 
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lowing governmental abuse.63  Relying on Freeman, the court in 
Bayless explained that “district court[s] must not merely defer to [a] 
police officer’s judgment.”64  Instead, courts should focus on how a 
reasonable officer, an officer who has been trained in and has 
knowledge of the applicable law, should have acted in that situa-
tion.65  In sum, the corroborated circumstances must provide suffi-
cient grounds for the officer to suspect the actual legal wrongdoing.66 
IV. NEW YORK JUDICIAL HISTORY 
A. Evaluating a Justifiable Frisk 
In People v. De Bour,67 the New York Court of Appeals de-
veloped a four-level test to evaluate police conduct when faced with a 
street encounter with a suspected criminal.68  To determine the consti-
tutionality of a frisk conducted by a police officer, a level-three intru-
sion must be examined.69  In De Bour, while police officers patrolled 
an empty street after midnight, they saw a man, the defendant, walk-
ing towards them on the same side of the sidewalk.70  When the de-
fendant was within thirty or forty feet of the officers, he crossed the 
street and the police officers did the same.71  When the officers 
reached the defendant, they asked him what he was doing, and the de-
fendant nervously responded that he was going to a friend’s house.72  
The officers then asked the defendant for identification, but the de-
 
63 Freeman, 735 F.3d at 102 (explaining that reasonable suspicion does not mean simply 
accepting whatever circumstances are offered by the government as necessarily demonstrat-
ing sufficient grounds to suspect legal wrongdoing). 
64 Bayless, 201 F.3d at 133 (clarifying that courts must adhere to the objective standard 
applied as a reasonable officer when assessing such factors). 
65 Simms v. Village of Albion, 115 F.3d 1098, 1106 (2d Cir. 1997). 
66 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (clarifying that although certain acts 
may be deemed innocent when evaluated separately, the factors can raise a reasonable suspi-
cion when corroborated and judged against a “reasonable officer” standard). 
67 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
68 Id. at 571-72. 
69 John H. Wilson, Legal Standards for Police Interaction with the Public, N.Y.L.J. (Sep-
tember 23, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202620154543&thepage=2 (connecting the holding in De Bour with the holding in Terry to 
show that a level-three intrusion from the decision in De Bour is equivalent to what the 
Court determined to be a “stop” in Terry). 
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fendant had none.73  One officer noticed a slight bulge in the defend-
ant’s jacket and asked him to unzip his jacket.74  The defendant com-
plied, and the officers observed and recovered a loaded revolver from 
defendant’s waistband and placed him under arrest.75  The court held 
that this intrusion was reasonable under the circumstances because 
the intrusion was minimal and limited in scope.76  The evidence may 
have been suppressed if the police forcefully detained the defendant 
before actually seeing the revolver; however, the police were justified 
in their initial inquiry because of the time, place, and defendant’s 
suspicious actions of crossing the street.77  Lastly, defendant volun-
tarily revealed his weapon when he unzipped his jacket, which 
showed minimal intrusion and justified the frisk and ensuing arrest.78 
B. Case Law Defining Reasonable Suspicion 
In People v. Shuler,79 the court provided a very detailed defi-
nition of what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” when a police of-
ficer is contemplating whether to detain a suspect.80  On its face, rea-
sonable suspicion involves “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to 
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person under the circum-
stances to believe criminal activity is at hand.”81  The court in Schuler 
held that reasonable suspicion involves corroborated circumstances, 
based on its interpretation of the Court’s holding in Terry.82  Some 
courts have interpreted Terry as holding that “an officer who reason-
ably suspects that a detainee is armed may conduct a frisk or take 
other protective measures even in the absence of probable cause.”83  
In Shuler, however, the court held that “[t]he officer must have 
knowledge of some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable 




75 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565. 
76 Id. at 570. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 949 N.Y.S.2d 758 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
80 Id. at 760. 




84 Schuler, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (quoting People v. Batista, 672 N.E.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. 
9
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is a narrow interpretation of reasonable suspicion because the court 
provided specific factors that can raise a reasonable suspicion of dan-
ger, which include “the substance and reliability of the report that 
brought the officers to the scene, the nature of the crime that the po-
lice are investigating, the suspect’s behavior and the shape, size, and 
location of any bulges in the suspect’s clothing.”85  The court held 
that this intrusion was reasonable under the circumstances because it 
was minimal and limited in scope.86 
C. Facts or Circumstances that Support a Reasonable 
Suspicion 
In People v. Stevenson, the court held that a noticeable bulge 
in the suspect’s waistband and the suspect’s refusal to answer the po-
lice officer’s questions did not justify a frisk of the suspect.87  In Ste-
venson, a detective was inside an unmarked vehicle when he noticed 
the defendant walk by.88  The detective noticed a bulge in the defend-
ant’s waistband and observed him adjusting the area of his clothing 
where the bulge was located several times.89  The detective subse-
quently detained the defendant and frisked his person.90 
With exception to the bulge in the suspect’s waistband, the 
court alluded to the fact that there were no other circumstances to 
suggest that the suspect posed a threat to the police officer or that 
criminal activity was afoot.91  On the other hand, the detective was 
justified to question the suspect because he noticed the bulge in his 
clothing.92  The subsequent frisk, however, was not justified because 
the suspect had the right to refuse the police officer’s questions.93  
Even though the officer found a gun on the suspect, the evidence was 
suppressed because there was no reasonable suspicion of dangerous 
activity.94 
 
1996)); People v. Davenport, 939 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2004); Stevenson, 
779 N.Y.S.2d at 499. 
85 Schuler, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 760. 
86 Id. 
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Although the aforementioned facts of Stevenson did not con-
stitute a justifiable frisk, there are many instances where New York 
courts have upheld the constitutionality of an officer’s frisk.  It is 
worth noting, however, that the common circumstance in these cases 
is that the frisking officer responded to a police call of gun shots or 
other criminal activity.95  Courts often require corroborated evidence 
to justify a police officer’s finding of reasonable suspicion in order to 
conduct a frisk during a street encounter.96 
For example, in People v. Davenport,97 police officers re-
sponded to a reported gun shot at a specific location.98  The police of-
ficers made a timely arrival to the scene and noticed the defendant 
walking with his hand placed on his waistband.99  The officers also 
noted that the defendant looked nervous as he was swiftly looking in 
multiple directions.100  After the defendant noticed the officer, he 
slowly retreated.101  In response, the officer frisked the defendant’s 
waistband and recovered a loaded firearm.102  Considering the “totali-
ty of the circumstances,” the court found that the officer was justified 
in conducting a limited intrusion of the defendant’s person.103 
A corroboration of evidence involving gunshots and a defend-
ant’s suspicious actions occurred in People v. Warren.104  In Warren, 
the officer heard gunshots and investigated the area from which the 
sounds were coming.105  The officer observed defendant “tugging on 
an object in his waistband” and asked defendant to show his hands.106  
 
95 See, e.g., People v. Benjamin, 414 N.E.2d 645, 647 (N.Y. 1980) (“an anonymous tip of 
‘men with guns’, standing alone, does not justify intrusive police action, and certainly does 
not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion warranting a stop and frisk.”); see also People v. 
Celaj, 760 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding that an anonymous tip of men with weap-
ons supported by other factors such as temporal proximity, suspect descriptions, and a bulge 
on the suspect’s waistband can justify a frisk); Davenport, 939 N.Y.S.2d 475-76 (holding 
that an officer responding to a report of gunshots may conduct a frisk when he observes ar-
ticulable facts and makes rational inferences that suggest the suspect is a threat to his or the 
public’s safety). 
96 People v. Lopez, 864 N.Y.S.2d 696, 704 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
97 939 N.Y.S.2d 473. 
98 Id. at 474. 
99 Id. at 475. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Davenport, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
103 Id. at 476. 
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The defendant complied after the officer’s third request, and the of-
ficer proceeded to pat him down.107  The officer recovered a firearm 
from the defendant’s waistband.108  The court held that the officer 
was justified in approaching defendant from his initial observa-
tions.109  Furthermore, given the sound of gun shots and the defend-
ant’s suspicious actions, the officer had a valid concern for his safety; 
therefore, the frisk was justified.110 
V. INDIRECT RACIAL PROFILING 
The unjustified frisk in Kennebrew implicated issues of indi-
rect racial profiling.  The police based their suspicions of danger off 
of the defendant’s clothing and tattoo.  Studies have been conducted 
in recent times showing that this type of police work is the product of 
indirect racial profiling.111  Most notably, similar issues to the ones 
raised in Kennebrew have been raised in New York City in recent 
times. 
A. Floyd v. City of New York 
On August 12, 2013, United States District Court Judge Shira 
Scheindlin filed a memorandum of her ruling in Floyd v. City of New 
York.112  Floyd involved a class action suit against the city of New 
York for violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113  This case was monu-
mental for New York City because Judge Scheindlin’s ruling de-
clared NYPD’s “stop and frisk” practices unconstitutional.114  Judge 
Scheindlin indicated that the police force was practicing indirect ra-
 
107 Id. at 375-76. 
108 Id. at 376. 
109 Warren, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 120 J. AM. STATISTICAL 
ASS’N 813 (Sept. 2007), http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/frisk9.pdf; 
The New York Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of 
the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General; Delores Jones-Brown et al., 
Stop, Question & Frisk Policing Practices in New York City: A Primer 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_version.pdf. 
112 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
113 Id. at 671. 
114 Id. 
12
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cial profiling, blatantly disregarding the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment and that the city’s highest officials were ignoring the po-
lice force’s discriminatory practices.115 
B. Statistical Evidence of Unlawful Stops 
The plaintiffs in Floyd relied heavily on expert testimony 
from Jeffrey Fagan, a Columbia University professor who conducted 
a study on the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices.116  Judge Scheindlin, 
as the fact finder at trial, deemed Fagan’s testimony to be credible.117  
In an eight and one half year span, from January 2004 to June 2012, 
the NYPD recorded over 4.4 million “stops,” and more than half of 
those stops resulted in a subsequent frisk for weapons.118  Even more 
surprising than that staggering figure, those 2.3 million frisks resulted 
in a 98.5% failure rate.119  In other words, police officers only found a 
weapon 1.5% of the time they conducted stop and frisks in that time 
frame.120  Furthermore, only 12% of those stops resulted in either an 
arrest or a summons.121 
Perhaps even more concerning than the failure rate of the 
NYPD’s stop and frisks from 2004 through 2012 is the evidence of 
racial profiling.  “In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped 
was black, in 31% the person was Hispanic, and in 10% the person 
was white.”122  Also, the police records reflect that officers used force 
in 23% of the stops involving blacks, 24% of the stops involving 
Hispanics, and 17% of the stops involving whites.123  One may argue 
that this disparity can be attributed to more frequent possession of 
weapons among those minority groups; however, police seized a 
higher percentage of weapons from stopping whites than blacks or 
Hispanics.124  Lastly, it is alarming that “[f]or the period 2004 
through 2009, when any law enforcement action was taken following 
a stop, blacks were 30% more likely to be arrested (as opposed to re-
 
115 Id. 
116 Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
117 Id. at 167. 
118 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (2013). 
119 Id. at 558. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 583. 
122 Id. at 559. 
123 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
124 Id. 
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ceiving a summons) than whites, for the same suspected crime.”125 
C. Options and Obstacles for Reform 
The overarching question courts are faced with when imple-
menting reform is whether there is a greater duty to protect public 
safety given the prosecutions resulting from the ‘stop and frisk’ prac-
tices or to protect the unalienable rights set forth in the Fourth 
Amendment.  Generally, it is difficult for courts to efficiently review 
the actions of police officers when dealing with stop and frisks. 
Police officers in New York City are required to fill out a 
“UF-250” form when they conduct a stop and frisk.126  Before Floyd, 
the UF-250 form required the officer to check off boxes, in reference 
to the reasons for the stop and frisk.127  By merely checking off box-
es, officers were given opportunities to justify a ‘stop and frisk’ when 
there was no real legal justification.128  These boxes contain vague 
descriptions that can easily be justified in most situations, for exam-
ple, “Area Has High Incidence of Reported Offenses of Type Under 
Investigation,” “Furtive Movements,” and “Inappropriate Attire.”129  
To remedy this potential injustice, the court in Floyd held that the 
UF-250 form must be revised to contain a new section in which the 
officer is required to record, in his or her own words, the legal justifi-
cation for the stop.130  This revision of the form will implement strict-
er requirements for officers to make a stop and the subsequent docu-
mentation will allow courts to more accurately evaluate the 
constitutionality of the stop, should a future issue arise.131  Susan 
Hutson, an independent monitor of the New Orleans Police Depart-
ment, noted that most experts believe that implementing a require-
ment for officers to provide a detailed narrative would be the most 
optimal way to gather information for judicial review and, in turn, 
 
125 Id. at 560. 
126 Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 163. 
127 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 681. 
128 Id. 
129 Steven Zeidman, Whither the Criminal Court: Confronting Stops and Frisks, 76 ALB. 
L. REV 1187, 1200-01 (2012-2013) (quoting Delores Jones-Brown et al., Stop, Question, & 
Frisk Policing Practices in New York City: A Primer 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_version.pdf) (explaining that 
“furtive movements” and “inappropriate attire” provides very little guidance for constitu-
tional analysis in the courts, while allowing police officers to justify stops). 
130 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 681 
131 Id. 
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prevent racial biases.132  Additionally, New York City officials have 
expressed concern over the discriminatory issues arising out of the 
City’s stop and frisk policy.133  In fact, twenty-seven of the fifty-one 
members of the New York City Council filed an amicus brief, which 
emphasized the rising distrust between minority groups and the 
NYPD as well as the reinforcement of racial stereotypes.134 
A huge obstacle to implementing efficient reform is the fact 
that “frisking” is largely unreviewable, both judicially and adminis-
tratively.135  The Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) is the 
administrative body to which a civilian may file a complaint of an un-
lawful stop and frisk.136  Thirty percent of the claims filed with the 
CCRB are a result of a claim to unlawful police practices during a 
stop and frisk.137  A major problem with this process is that the 
CCRB dismisses all cases in which the complainant cannot be 
reached or refused to answer questions, which results in a dismissal 
of about sixty-five percent of these complaints.138  Even if the com-
plaint survived as one of the few cases that were substantiated by the 
CCRB, the complaint is then turned over to the complete discretion 
of the NYPD Commissioner.139 
Statistics show that the NYPD Commissioner engaged in sus-
pect practices when reviewing the substantiated cases.140  “The 
NYPD is notorious for dismissing substantiated complaints without 
taking action; in 2009, the NYPD declined to prosecute 30% to 40% 
of cases referred to it as substantiated by the CCRB.”141  To remedy 
this apparent injustice, an “Administrative Prosecutions Unit” was 
created, but the only attorney employed on this unit left his position 
in 2011 and has not been replaced.142 
In addition to the administrative obstacles, a complainant is 
 
132 Id. 
133 Floyd, 238 F.R.D. at 159-60. 
134 Id. 
135 Dasha Kabakova, The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department’s 
Investigative Stops, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 540-41 (2012) (identifying 
that stops and frisks often do not result in an arrest which leaves no evidence to be sup-
pressed and most individual civil rights suits are barred by qualified immunity). 
136 Id. at 555-56. 
137 Id. at 556. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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also faced with the doctrine of qualified immunity, which serves as a 
major protection for police officers.143  Under this doctrine, police of-
ficers are immune from liability for money damages in suits brought 
against them in their individual capacities if their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.  Police officers’ actions are 
evaluated by an objectively reasonable standard, determining whether 
the officer believed his or her actions to be lawful when the stop and 
frisk occurred.144 
Ultimately, when one’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated 
as a result of a stop and frisk, the best remedy one can hope for is the 
suppression of evidence, granted that some form of evidence was re-
covered.  The suppression of evidence can be remedial at trial, but 
statistics show that an overwhelming majority of stop and frisks do 
not result in an arrest.145  Given the inapplicability of suppressing ev-
idence for many complainants coupled with the obstacles to adminis-
trative action, it is unlikely that one can enjoy any remedial measure 
after being victimized by an unlawful stop and frisk. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The issues arising out of Kennebrew and New York City in 
general are ubiquitous and frequent.  Although defendant in 
Kennebrew succeeded in suppressing the evidence against him, the 
lack of reasonable suspicion implicated evidence of racial profiling.  
Thousands of New Yorkers are stopped, questioned, and frisked an-
nually.  The Attorney General of New York recognized the issues 
arising out of the stop and frisk policies and even expressed that this 
is “the most serious civil rights issue . . . facing the city.”146  It is im-
perative to implement reform in order to avoid racial discrimination 
within the criminal justice system.  As demonstrated in Kennebrew, it 
is unjust to intrude on citizens’ rights to privacy based on racial as-
 
143 Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995). 
144 Id. 
145 See Lopez, 864 N.Y.S.2d at 700 (distinguishing that “[i]t is only in those limited in-
stances where seizures of contraband actually occur that the courts are confronted with hav-
ing to review the legality of police conduct.”), aff’d, 886 N.Y.S.2d 894 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
2008). 
146 Richard Pérez-Pena, Police May Have Understated Street Searches, Spitzer Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 23, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/23/nyregion/police-may-have-
understated-street-searches-spitzer-says.html. 
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sumptions.  The fact that defendant had a traditional gang tattoo and 
wore gang colors may be unsettling for a police officer, but it certain-
ly does not justify an unwarranted frisk.  These basic principles are 
inherent in the Framers’ language and intentions in both the United 
States and New York constitutions.  Police officers should be sub-
jected to more intensive training in stop and frisk procedures and they 
should be held to a higher standard of accountability within the judi-
cial system.  Judicial review of this accountability is imperative to 
give legitimacy to these reforms as well.  If substantive changes are 
not efficiently executed, discriminatory police practices will inevita-
bly continue and there will be injustice, therefore, will continue to 
plague the criminal justice system.  Ultimately, as the New York 
Times effectively conveyed, “[t]he idea of universal suspicion with-
out individual evidence is what Americans find abhorrent and what 
black men in America must constantly fight.  It is pervasive in polic-
ing policies—like stop-and-frisk . . . regardless of the collateral dam-
age done to the majority of innocents.  It’s like burning down a house 






147 Charles M. Blow, The Whole System Failed Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 
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